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The parliamentary election held on February 20, 2004 in Iran was a key turning point in that 
country's political evolution. The election marked the conclusive end of the campaign for political 
and social reform initiated by Mohammad Khatami after he was elected president in a landslide 
vote in May 1997. However, while it is clear that Khatami's efforts have failed, it is not clear what 
will come next. Although Khatami's Conservative opponents decisively won the election, they 
have little popular support and it remains uncertain whether they can govern effectively. 
Moreover, the radical wing of Khatami's Reformist movement remains intact and could present a 
strong challenge to the Conservatives in the future. Therefore, while the February election 
essentially marked the end of the Khatami era, Iran's future remains very uncertain. 
This article examines the likely prospects for Iran in the aftermath of the 2004 parliamentary 
election. It begins by reviewing several key outcomes of the election that have important 
implications for Iranian politics in the coming period. It then discusses several domestic political 
scenarios that might emerge in Iran in the next few years. It concludes by examining the 
implications of the election for regional security and for U.S. interests in the coming years. 
The 2004 Parliamentary Election 
Close observers of Iranian politics had been eagerly awaiting the February 2004 election for 
some time. The previous parliamentary election, held in February 2000, had been bitterly fought 
and produced a sweeping victory for Khatami's Reformist allies over their Conservative 
opponents. The Conservatives then mounted a concerted effort to block the Reformists' efforts to 
implement political and social reforms, halting progress on these reforms and leaving the 
country's political system hopelessly deadlocked. As this deadlock persisted, the Iranian public 
grew increasingly disenchanted with Khatami and the Reformists, who seemed incapable of 
delivering on their promises of far-reaching reform. This disenchantment was reflected in the 
February 2003 municipal council election, which saw a sharp drop in turnout and the defeat of 
almost all major Reformist candidates.  
The Reformists' declining popular support and their poor showing in the 2003 municipal council 
election raised the prospect that they might also do poorly in the 2004 parliamentary election. The 
Reformists therefore began to act more aggressively toward the Conservatives, most notably by 
pushing legislation to increase the power of the president and curb the power of the 
Conservative-dominated Judiciary and Guardian Council. (The Judiciary has imprisoned scores 
of prominent Reformists on trumped-up charges in recent years. The Guardian Council has 
authority to veto parliamentary legislation and vet all candidates for elected office.) The 
Reformist-dominated parliament overwhelmingly approved this legislation, but it was then vetoed 
by the Guardian Council; and the Reformists subsequently made no real effort to revive it. 
Moreover, despite some talk of boycotting the parliamentary election, the main leaders of the 
Reformist movement announced in the fall of 2003 that they would participate in the election as 
long as it was conducted fairly. 
The Conservatives tried to project a new image in the months prior to the election, with most of 
their leading candidates portraying themselves as pragmatists and advocating what has become 
known in Iran as the "China model." The China model has four main elements. First, its central 
focus is to reform Iran's economy in ways that will generate employment and raise living 
standards, which remain well below the levels reached before the Islamic revolution, more than 
25 years ago. Second, it calls for continuing the relaxation of restrictions on female dress codes 
and other cultural matters in order to provide a "safety valve" to reduce unrest, especially among 
Iran's deeply alienated youth. Third, it calls for better relations with the West, including the United 
States, in order to facilitate trade and foreign investment and further placate disenchanted 
Iranians. Fourth, it entails a freeze on political liberalization and the suppression of challenges to 
the Islamic regime and its Conservative leaders, though this, of course, is rarely mentioned 
openly. 
In early January 2004, the Guardian Council announced that it was disqualifying 43 percent of the 
eight thousand-odd candidates who had entered the election. Those disqualified included some 
eighty Reformist incumbents, including almost all Reformist leaders of parliament, and all 
Reformist candidates running for some 200 of the 290 seats in parliament. These disqualifications 
clearly would have ended the Reformists' control over parliament. The Reformists therefore 
denounced the disqualifications and threatened to boycott the election. Reformist members of 
parliament began a sit-in and declared that they would continue their protest until their colleagues 
were reinstated. Most cabinet members and provincial governors said they would resign if the 
disqualifications were not reversed. Iran's highest official, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who 
usually backs the Conservatives, even instructed the Guardian Council to reexamine the 
disqualifications and reinstate all incumbents. However, when the Guardian Council announced 
the final list of candidates on January 30, almost all of the eighty Reformist incumbents remained 
disqualified and most of the other disqualifications remained in effect.  
After this stunning announcement, 125 Reformist members of parliament declared that they 
would boycott the election and resign their seats, and the Reformist interior minister declared that 
the election would not be held on the scheduled date, February 20. However, President Khatami 
then announced that the election would be held on time, and he rejected the resignations of his 
cabinet ministers and provincial governors. These actions paved the way for the election to be 
held and signaled a split between the radical and moderate wings of the Reformist movement. 
The election was held on the scheduled date, and the results emerged during the following days. 
In a stunning defeat, the Reformist candidates who chose to contest the election took only about 
20 percent of the 225 seats decided in the first round. Key Reformist leaders such as Speaker of 
Parliament Mehdi Karrubi and Jamileh Kadivar, a prominent female member of parliament, were 
not elected in the first round. Conservatives took about 70 percent of the first-round seats, with 
the remainder going to independents. The turnout rate was 51 percent, much lower than the 67 
percent rate recorded in 2000, but considerably higher than the 30-40 percent rate most 
observers had expected. Consequently, roughly ten percent of the electorate voted for Reformist 
candidates and 35 percent voted for Conservatives. The corresponding figures in the 2000 
election were roughly 50 percent and 10-15 percent, respectively. The second round of voting 
took place on May 7 and produced very similar results.  
The most important conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the Iranian people are 
deeply disillusioned with the Reformists and chose to repudiate them, either by abstaining or by 
voting against them in this election. This disillusionment seems to have been aimed primarily at 
Khatami, who largely personified the reform movement and has been widely criticized in recent 
years for failing to confront the Conservatives more boldly. It is not clear whether this 
disillusionment extends to more-radical Reformists, since most of them were disqualified or 
boycotted the election. However, it seems likely that the radical Reformists also would have fared 
poorly if they had participated in the election because they had not clearly distinguished 
themselves from moderate Reformists in the eyes of most Iranians by the time of the election. 
However, the sharp drop in support for the Reformists does not necessarily mean that a large 
number of Iranians enthusiastically switched their support from the Reformists to the 
Conservatives. Roughly 10-20 percent of the electorate had voted for Conservative candidates in 
the two presidential elections and the municipal council and parliamentary elections held from 
1997 through 2001. These are the Conservatives' most devoted supporters. Since there is no 
reason to think the Conservatives' popularity has increased in the last few years, the 15-25 
percent of the electorate that voted for Conservatives in 2004 but not in 1997-2001 probably 
consists largely of apolitical Iranians who had voted for the Reformists previously but became 
disillusioned with them and either felt obliged to vote or decided to give the Conservatives a 
chance to implement the China model. In other words, most Iranians who voted for Conservatives 
in this election probably support them only half-heartedly. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that a majority of Iranians probably still favor the political and social reforms promoted 
by the Reformists but have given up on Khatami's moderate approach to achieving these 
reforms. 
Implications for Iran's Future 
It is difficult to say what will happen in Iran during the next few years. Indeed, this is perhaps the 
most uncertain time in Iran since the Khomeini era ended in the late 1980s. However, we can 
sketch several general scenarios that might emerge and discuss the conditions surrounding 
them. 
Iran probably will remain fairly stable in the short term, with no major challenges to the 
Conservative-dominated regime. The Reformists have been badly beaten and will need time to 
regroup. The election outcome and the lack of visible unrest during the period surrounding the 
election suggest that the Iranian people are not ready for an open confrontation, and may even 
want to give the Conservatives a chance to implement the China model. This "honeymoon 
period" may end as soon as May 2005, when the next presidential election could sharply raise 
tensions. 
In the longer term Iran could become more unstable, and there is some chance that a major 
challenge will emerge to the Conservatives. This is possible for two main reasons.  
First, it seems very unlikely that the Conservatives will be able to implement effective economic 
reform, which is the central focus of the China model. Very few Conservative leaders have the 
kind of technocratic outlook necessary to reform the economy. Moreover, the Conservatives will 
find it politically difficult to reduce the vast web of subsidies that has emerged over the years; and 
key Conservative constituencies centered in the bazaar and the parastatal foundations will 
oppose many other much-needed reforms. Finally, Iran's oil income is likely to remain high during 
the next few years, reducing the urgency of economic reform. Consequently, Iran's economy 
(outside of the oil sector) is likely to remain stagnant in the coming years and unemployment is 
likely to grow, fueling popular unrest. 
Second, even if economic reform and other elements of the China model can be implemented, 
most Iranians firmly oppose the Conservatives' broader vision for Iran. This is especially true of 
Iran's rapidly growing youth population, which strongly favors greater political and cultural 
freedom and has little attachment to the Islamic regime and the revolution that produced it. This 
gap between the aspirations of most Iranians and the intentions of Iran's Conservative rulers will 
continue to grow as the country's youth become increasingly influential. Consequently, popular 
opposition to the Conservative-dominated regime is likely to grow, regardless of whether the 
economy improves.  
Although domestic unrest therefore will probably grow after the Conservatives' honeymoon period 
ends, it is not at all certain whether this will produce a major challenge to the Conservatives and, 
if so, whether such a challenge will succeed or fail. Two main factors bearing on this remain very 
uncertain. 
First, it is not at all clear who would lead such a challenge. The only faction capable of leading a 
major challenge to the Conservatives in the foreseeable future is the radical Reformists, and they 
have not given any indication that they intend to do so. The moderate Reformists clearly will not 
challenge the Conservatives, and it is doubtful, in any case, whether many Iranians would support 
them now. Religious-nationalist groups like the Liberation Movement of Iran and monarchist 
forces operating abroad have little popular support in Iran. There is no significant secular 
democratic movement. The Islamic-leftist Mojahedin-e Khalq is widely despised. New opposition 
leaders might emerge in the coming years, but none are apparent now. 
Second, the Iranian people have become remarkably quiescent during the last few years, and it is 
not clear what might lead them to become more active politically. It is especially bewildering that 
Iranians have not reacted strongly to the Conservatives' various attacks on the Reformists in 
recent years, to their blatant efforts to control the election in February, and to Iran's continuing 
economic stagnation. If these conditions have not activated the Iranian public, it is difficult to say 
what might do so. Moreover, high oil prices and a possible U.S.-Iran rapprochement could help 
defuse popular unrest during the next few years. 
If a major challenge does somehow emerge to the Conservatives, it could produce one of three 
main outcomes. First, in what could be called an "Iranian Velvet Revolution," a major challenge 
might break the Conservatives' grip on power and produce a relatively democratic regime—either 
an "Islamic democracy" or perhaps a secular democracy, depending on how events play out. 
Khatami's failure to reform the Islamic regime from within suggests that this will occur only if a 
mass movement of some sort emerges. Second, in what could be called an "Iranian Tienanmen 
Square," the Conservatives might succeed in putting down such a challenge and then rule in a 
much more repressive manner, replacing the relatively mild Islamic-populist regime that exists 
today with an Islamic dictatorship. Third, both sides might back down before a Velvet Revolution 
or Tienanmen Square scenario emerges, producing a reversion to the status quo ante. 
It is impossible to say in advance which of these scenarios might occur. Clearly the outcome of 
such a confrontation would depend very much on the determination of the challengers to achieve 
their goals, the loyalty of the security forces, and the actions of key leaders. However, each of 
these factors would be affected very much by the unfolding dynamics of the confrontation itself, 
so we cannot say with any certainty how they might play out and which outcome might emerge. 
Of course, this uncertainty and the gravity of these outcomes for Iran's future might well persuade 
Iran's leaders to avoid confrontation or back down in the early stages of one - a pattern that has, 
in fact, played out repeatedly in Iran in recent years. Consequently, the most likely scenario for 
Iran's future probably is a continuation of the tense factional standoff that has prevailed for many 
years now. 
Implications for Regional Security and U.S. Interests 
Regardless of what happens domestically, Iran's foreign policy is likely to remain fairly pragmatic 
in the foreseeable future, continuing the pattern of recent years. Both the Conservatives and the 
radical Reformists are preoccupied with domestic matters and therefore are likely to avoid open 
confrontation, both with their neighbors and with the West. Moreover, inflammatory rhetoric aside, 
recent trends suggest that both factions want better relations not only with Europe but also with 
the United States, whose economic sanctions are a major obstacle to improving Iran's economy. 
Nevertheless, there could be two important foreign-policy differences between a radical 
Reformist-dominated regime and a Conservative-dominated regime. First, while the radical 
Reformists have given up the confrontational, anti-Western foreign policy views they once held, 
the Conservatives' coalition contains a small but important element of foreign-policy hardliners. 
Consequently, Iran's leaders are more likely to challenge the regional status quo under a 
Conservative-dominated regime in response to demands from these hardliners. Such a challenge 
might take the form of continued efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability, efforts to 
expand Iran's intermediate-range missile forces and its biological and chemical weapons 
capabilities, and efforts to maintain a capacity to attack the United States and its regional allies 
through proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and perhaps forces in Iraq. The radical Reformists 
express little interest in these matters and seem more determined to improve relations with the 
United States than the Conservatives. 
Second, the Conservatives generally are more xenophobic and less pragmatic than the radical 
Reformists, so a Conservative-dominated regime would be less reliable and less trustworthy than 
a radical Reformist-dominated regime. With the Conservatives largely in control of foreign policy, 
Iran in recent months has violated both the spirit and the letter of its October 2003 agreement 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the development of its nuclear 
capabilities. Unreliable behavior of this sort is likely to continue as long as the Conservatives 
control Iran's foreign policy. Moreover, agreements with Iran to stop its missile development, its 
biological and chemical weapons development, or its support for proxy forces like Hezbollah 
would be even harder to verify than the IAEA agreement, so Iran's behavior probably would be 
even more unreliable on these matters under the Conservatives. 
Consequently, since the Conservatives are likely to remain in control of Iran's foreign policy for 
the foreseeable future, we can expect continued efforts by Iran to avoid confrontation and even 
achieve rapprochement with the United States and its allies, but also continued challenges to the 
United States and likely violations of any agreements that might be reached on key issues. For 
substantial change to occur in Iran's foreign policy, a major change in Iranian domestic politics—a 
Velvet Revolution of some sort—is probably necessary. This seems unlikely during the 
foreseeable future. 
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